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AGENCY.
A, a physician, contracted with B, superintendent of the X
corporation, to attend an employe. B had no authority to
Liability of

employ A. Neither B nor the corporation was held

liable on the contract. Sourane v. McRoy Clay
Works, 85 N. W. (Ind.) 782.
For a further discussion, see Note, p. 240 of this issue.

Agent without
Authority

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of the United States, reversing the decision of the Circuit Court, held that the fixing of railroad
R~ailroad
Commission
of
2Zing
Rates

rates is a legislative act, and the validity thereof
must be passed on by the highest court of the
state before being taken to the United States
Court. The Virginia Passenger Rate Cases (not

yet published).
For a further discussion of the opinion of the Court see
Note, p. 236 of this issue.
CONTRACTS.
Suit on a promissory note. The note was given in payment
for certain patent rights of the plaintiff. The defendant was
object
allowed to testify that he had an unlawful
in entering into the contract. The jury found that
Ptent
both parties intended to start a "bubble" scheme,
to consist of selling, in reality not patent rights, but only territorial rights. The plaintiff appealed, assigning as error, inter
alia, the admission of defendant's testimony as to his intent in
forming the contract. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that the aim of the contract was clearly contrary to public
policy, and that since the contract was proved, the plaintiff
could not recover on the note. Twentieth Century Co. v. Quilling, 117 N. W. lOO7. As to the question of the admission of
(255)
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the defendant's evidence, however; the opinion is not explicit.
It was held that to admit it in this case couild, at the most,
have been nothing more than harmless error, "because it was
in perfect harmony with the words of the contract as defendant
claims it was made." This reasoning can only be supported onl
the supposition that the general purpose of both parties to
enter into a contract contrary to public policy, was manifest
from other testimony not reported. A few lines below, however, the Court says, apparently referring to contracts, "When
the act in question is ambiguous as regards the intent, direct
evidence is always proper." If this does in fact refer to contracts, it sets forth a most unusual proposition, and sanctions
the varying of a written agreement by evidence of the undisclosed intention of either party.

CONVERSION.
Negotiable bonds, secured by a mortgage, were issued by
the Medina Gaslight Company. The secretary of the company
pledged these bonds with the defendant, as colTransfer
of
Bonds

Wrongfully

lateral for a private debt of his own. Defendant
received the bonds knowing that they were wrong-

fully pledged and fully cognizant of the fact that
they were only for corporate use, and could only
be negotiated by the president of the company. The defendant
later delivered the bonds to another bank upon that bank's paying them the amount of the debt for which they were held as
collateral. Held, when the defendant assumed to transfer the
bonds to the German American Bank, it committed an act which
was in hostility to the right and title of the plaintiff. This
was a distinct and unequivocal conversion. MacDonnell v.
Buffalo Loan & Safe Deposit Co., 85 N. E. (N. Y.) 8oi.
All of the Court were of opinion that there had been a
conversion, but Haight and Bartlett, JJ., dissented on the
ground that the conversion had taken place when the bonds
were originally pledged, in which case the action was barred by
the statute of limitations. The authorities are uniform that
where goods have been wrongfully sold and bought, both
buyer and seller are liable for conversion, if the buyer was
cognizant of the seller's wrong. (Am. & Eng. Ency. Vol.
XXVIII, p. 685). But the dissenting opinion applied this rule
likewise to the case where the relation was one of pledgor
and pledgee instead of buyer and seller, and several cases
Pledgedajster
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were cited in support of the proposition. Not one of these
cases, however, stands for the doctrine advanced, namely that
the conversion should date from the reception of the bonds by
the defendant. The view of the majority of the Court that
there was no conversion by the defendant until the disposition
of the bonds by it, in the absence of any demand and refusal
previously, would seem in accord with reason and authority.
It was also contended in the dissent that since the taking from
the defendant was by judicial process (an attachment) there
could be no conversion. (Van Hesse v. Mackay, 55 Hun. 365).
But since the execution was against the secretary, and the defendant knew that the bonds were not his property, he was
guilty of conversion in delivering the property upon payment
of the debt for which they were pledged.

CRIMINAL LAW.
A charge that if defendant without justification shot a
pistol in the direction of the prosecutor, within carrying distance of the pistol, not intending to hit him, but
Whmt
Contitutsan intending to scare him, he would be guilty of an
Asault
assault, was held correct in Edwards v. State, 62
S. E. 565.
For a further discussion, see Note, p. 249 of this issue.

EQUITY.
Complainant asked for an injunction to restrain defendant
from engaging in a business which he had agreed in writing not
to engage in for a stated period. Defendant averPlendruz:
red in his answer that the written agreement had
ResposIve

been rescinded and an oral one substituted in

which there was no reference to the restriction
on trade. Held, no witness was called by complainant to overcome the answer. Bill dismissed. Thomas v. Borden, 222 Pa.
184.
This case follows the well settled rule of equity, that an
answer responsive to a bill can be overcome only by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness corroborated by circumstances elsewhere in evidence. Eaton's Appeal, 66 Pa. 483.
This rule was borrowed from the Civil Law and first appeared
in Chancery shortly after the middle of the Seventeenth

RECENT CASES

EQUITY (Continued).
century. Wakelin v. Walthal, 2 Ch. Ca. 8. At that time no
explanation of the rule was given, but in modern times it has
been explained as follows: The plaintiff calls upon the defendant to answer the allegations he makes and thereby admits the
answer to he evidence. If it is testimony it is equal to that of
any other witness. Therefore, if it is disproved by only one
witness for the plaintiff, he cannot prevail, as the balance of
proof is not in his favor. He must have another witness or
else additional corroborative circumstances elsewhere in evidence, in order to succeed. Clark v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch.
153. For a criticism of the rule see, "Responsive Answer in
Equity Considered as Evidence." J. M. Gest, Pa. Bar Assoc.
1904.
In an action to cancel a deed because of plaintiff grantor's
incapacity, it appeared that the deed conveyed practically all
her property, that she was adjudged incompeCncellation o tent ten days after making the deed; that she
Deeds:
Necesity for was 70 years old, and for some time prior
Return Z
thereto had been suffering mental and physical decline. Held, that under such circumstancces, plaintiff need not show, in suing to avoid the
deed on account of grantee's fraud, that the deed was
made without consideration or for an inadequate consideration, though, had she relied solely on want of consideration,
she must have shown that fact, or, had she relied upon constructive fraud, she must have shown what the consideration
was, and an offer to return it. Schinder v. Pazoo, 97 Pac. Rep.
755There is nothing new in this case. While the usual rule in
suing to cancel a deed on the ground of fraud is that the grantor
should place or offer to place the grantee in statu quo (Pomeroy's Eq., pages 910, 953), this obligation has been limited to
those who are mentally responsible (Crossen v. Murphy, 31 Ore.
114) ; those who were not mentally responsible at the making
of the contract are under no such obligation. Crossen v. Murphy, 31 Ore. 114; Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray [Mass.] 279.
The reason given for this exception is the broad one of
public policy. One who deals with a lunatic does so at his
peril. To quote from Mr. Justice Thomas (Gibson v. Soper,
6 Gray 279): "To say that an insane man before he can avoid
a voidable deed must put the grantee in statu quo would be to
say, in effect, that in a large majority of cases his deed shall
not be avoided at all. The more insane the grantor was when
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the deed was made, the less likely will he be to retain the fruits
of his bargain so as to be able to make restitution. If he was
so far demented as not to know or recollect what the bargain
was, the difficulty will be still greater."
Both cases and text-books are very meagre on this subject.
The case quoted above seems to intimate that no consideration
need be returned in any case of insanity; but a better rule is
laid down in a later case which, on quoting the rule, limits it to
cases where fraud is practiced on one who is known at the
time to be insane, but not when the purchase and conveyance
are made in good faith for a good consideration, and without
knowledge of insanity. Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L. io8.
Since the facts in the present case show clearly a knowledge
of the insanity on the part of the grantee, and consequently a
preconceived intention to defraud, there could be no doubt as
to the justice of the case. A more interesting situation would
have arisen if the grantee had been ignorant of the fact, and
the grantor had squandered the consideration.

EVIDENCE.
An order dismissing a petition for an issue, devisavit vel non,
was appealed from. The only testimony of appellant was the
opinion of two handwriting experts to the effect
welgbt to be that decedent had not signed the will. As against
Testimony of
this there was the testimony of decedent's wife,
lxnwritg
appellee,
that he had executed and delivered the
Experts
ap
will to her, corroborated by that of the widow of
her brother-in-law, to whom she had given it, and by that of
one, Minnie Wyatt, to the same effect. There was also the
testimony of thirteen witnesses, who had known decedent for
years, that the signature to the will was genuine. Held, (quoting from Greenleaf, Evid. I5th Ed., Sec. 58o, note), "Upon
this kind of evidence (that of handwriting experts) learned
judges are of the opinion that very little if any reliance ought
to be placed." Fuller's Estate, 70 Atl. 1OO 5.
This case directly raised the question of the weight to be
given to the testimony of handwriting experts. This question
is not often raised, but whenever it has been considered, the
courts have, as in the principal case, declared such testimony
to be the lowest order of evidence. The reason for this rule
though not often given would seem to be that such testimony
is mere opinion evidence, based on the most uncertain and in-
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conclusive indications, and scarcely more certain to be reliable
than the opinions of the jurymen themselves. It was therefore
right in the principal case to disregard such evidence entirely
in the presence of such an overwhelming amount of direct
proof.
The plaintiff, and other residents of Kellogg, signed an
agreement to subscribe to $io,ooo worth of stock in the defendant company. The plantiff brings action to
Evidence ot
restrain the defendant from chauging its principal
place of business from Kellogg, and introduces an
As Part
Consideration
oral agreement, entered into by the defendant as
For written
Agreement
an inducement to subscribe to its stock, that its
principal plant should be located at Kellogg for
not less than five years.
Held,--"The testimony tending to show the parol agreement
to locate the factory at Kellogg for a term of not less than five
years was competent. The written contract was silent on the
subject and the testimony in question did not vary its terms."
Bolzin v. Gould Balance Valve Co., 118 N. W. 4o.
This case follows the broad rule laid down in Sutton v.
Weber (127 Iowa 361 i9o4), that "parol evidence is admissible . . . whenever there is a collateral oral contract, or
it appear that the real contract between the parties is part in
writing and part in parol." While it is uncertain how the Court
intended such indefinite language should be construed it would
seem, that these cases go the length of holding that the incompleteness of the written contract may be made to appear "by
going outside of the writing and proving that there was a
stipulation entered into, but not contained in it, and hence that
only part of the written contract was put in writing;" and as
was pointed out by Mitchell, J., in Wheaton, etc. Co. v. Noye
Mfg. Co. (66 Minn. i56, 1896), "if any such doctrine is to
obtain there would be very little left of the rule against varying written contracts by parol."
The written contract in our principal case was bilateral and
therefore the admission of the evidence offered seems to conflict with the rule laid down by Mr. Wigmore (Evidence, Sec.
2433), that where the contract consists of mutual promises
"the writing alone can be examined." The case of Galvin v.
Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (i8o Mass. 587, 19o2), where a parol
promise of employment was allowed to be proved as part consideration for a release reciting a money consideration, seems
at first sight nearly parallel, but may be distinguished on the
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ground that the release was executed, and the contract therefore
was not bilateral.
It would seem that the only ground on which the decision can
be defended is that the Court, following the rule adopted by the
best authorities, and construing the written contract "according to its subject-matter and the circumstances under which,
and the purposes for which, it was executed," concluded that it
was incomplete and that therefore parol evidence to prove a
supplementary term upon which the writing was silent was admissible. (Wheaton etc. Co. v. Noye Mfg. Co., 66 Minn. 156,
1896; Wigmore Evidence, Sec. 243.) The evidence, however,
does not seem to warrant the Court's conclusion.

FELLOW-SERVANTS.
Where the superintendent of an electric railway company
takes out a new car, which has never been used in the service
of the company, and acts as motorman during the
Superintendent
test, which is on the line of the company, he is not
Operating Car a fellow-servant of a motorman, operating a car
in the company's service, who is injured by the negligence of
the superintendent in operating the car under test. Latsha v.
Shamokin and Edgewood Electric Ry. Co., 222 Pa. 201 (1908).
A master owes a duty to his servants to furnish reasonably
safe appliances for them to use in his business. He cannot relieve himself of this duty except by performance. (Ross v.
Walker, 139 Pa. 42, 189o.)
Therefore, it follows that the master is liable if he delegates
to servants his duty to inspect railroad cars before receiving
them on his line and the servants to whom he has delegated
this duty are negligent in its performance, whereby an employe on said cars is injured. [Union Stockyards v. Goodwin,
57 Neb. 138 (1898).]
It has been held in Pennsylvania that a brakeman and a
car inspector are fellow-servants in the same circle of employment. [P. & R. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 119 Pa. 301 (1888);
contra, Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Daniels, 152 U. S. 684 (1894).]
But where a servant was employed by the master to construct
or repair machinery to be used in the master's business he is
responsible to his servants who use the machinery for any
negligence in the work of construction or repairing. [Pa. &
N. Y. Canal & R. R. Co. v. Mason, lO9 Pa. 296 (1885).]
It is said that where the negligence relates to anything which
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it was the master's duty to do, the master is liable. [Ross v.
Walker, supra.]
If that is the test then the present case is correctly decided
for here the servant (the superintendent) did not neglect to
provide safe appliances for the master's business, but was
negligent in the performance of an act relating to the testing of
the car. It is the duty of the master to test cars before placing
them in the hands of its servants for use in its business. Union
Stockyards v. Goodwin, supra.

INJUNCTIONS.
A brought a bill to restrain B from selling automobile seachlights enclosed in a shell imitative of A's unpatented shell. The
Court granted the injunction, although B's shell
Unfair Trad
Competition

had his name prominently appearing upon it, and

although B had never represented that his lamps
were made by A. Rushmore v. Mannhattan Screw and Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939.
For a full discussion, see Note, p. 246 of this issue.

JUDGMENTS.
In Nason v. Nelson, 62 S. E. 625, a case in which the mercantile interests of the state were largely involved, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina directly overruled the
Effect of an
overruling
earlier case of Finch v. Gregg, 126 N. C. 176. The
general doctrine governing the effect of such overruling was clearly recognized, i. e., that the Court declares not
that the prior decision was bad law, but that it never was law
at all. From this it follows that the later decision is, in a
sense, retroactive, for if this doctrine be carried to its logical
conclusion, it seems that even property rights acquired
on the faith of the earlier decision, must be deemed
no rights at all in the light of the later one. There are, however, exceptions to this strictly logical conclusion, which are
worthy of note. (i) A party who has entered into a contract
in reliance upon the judicial interpretation of a statute may not
be prejudiced by a subsequent change of interpretation. In this
case the codified law, as explained by the courts, is taken to be
not merely evidence of what the law is-as are other judicial
decisions-but a statement of what the law in fact is. (2) In
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North Carolina-Hill v. Brown, i44 N. C. i i7-property
rights have been similarly protected when acquired, not in reliance upon the interpretation of a statute, but simply in reliance
on the Court's statement of the common law. (3) A curious
exception to the general rule occurred in the case of Hood v.
Society for Protection, 221 Pa. 474. After decisiosis of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to the effect that certain words
created a vested remainder, the testator used those words in his
will. After his death, but before the will came into dispute,
the Supreme Court decided that this particular set of words
did not create a vested remainder. Having thus established a
new rule for finding out the intention of testators, the Court
decided to follow the old rule when this particular will came
before them. It was held that since the object in construing
wills was to discover the testator's intention, such intention
could best be read in the light of those rules of law which
governed the construction of intention at the time the will was
made. This decision must be justified by assuming the testator
to have had knowledge of the decisions of the Court as to the
matter in question.
LIBEL.
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in the case of
Barry v. McCollum, 70 Atlantic, 1035, follows the English rule
with regard to libel and holds that, where there
What is a
Privileged
were grounds for the belief on the part of defendOccasion?
ant that the accusations made were true, and he
published them honestly and in good faith, it is not an actionable libel.
For a full discussion of the principles involved see Note, p.
243 of this issue.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Defendants were respectively president and secretary of a
corporation, and also directors and large stockholders. The
Presentment corporation had no assets whatever excepting cerFor Payment tain patents, upon which it could not realize and
and Notice of
the consideration for the contracts which were beDishonor
ing executed by defendants and another directorthose three constituting the active directors and conducting the
business of the company. These contracts the defendants regarded as valuable. For the purpose of continuing the
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performance of these contracts they borrowed money from
Luckenbach giving a note which they signed on behalf of the
corporation without authority of the board of directors and
also with said other director endorsed individually. When the
note matured the company had no money with which to pay it
as its executive officers knew. The note was not presented for
payment, nor was formal notice of its dishonor given to any of
the endorsers.
Under the Negotiable Instrument Act, May 16, 19Ol
(P. L. 2o6), Section 8o of which provides that, "presentment for payment is not required in order to charge an endorser where the instrument was made or accepted for his
accomodation, and he had no reason to expect that the instrument will be paid if presented ;" and section 115 which provides
that, "notice of dishonor is not required to be given to an endorser in either of the following cases * * * (2) where the
endorser is the person to whom the instrument is presented for
payment; (3) where the instrument was made or accepted for
his accommodation ;" it was held that the holder of the note was
not required to present it to the defendants for payment by the
company, nor to give them an unnecessary notice of its dishonor, in order to hold them as endorsers. Luckenbach v. McDonald, 164 Fed. 296 (19o8).
In order to charge the endorser of a promissory note without
presentment to the maker two things are necessary: (i) that
the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation
and (2) that the endorser had no reason to expect that the instrument will be paid if presented. From the reported facts it
is not clear that this case comes under section 8o. The maker
of the note was engaged in the completion of contracts which
its active directors thought to be valuable. Being in need of
funds to complete the contract, it gave its note to Luckenbach
to secure the payment of money borrowed for that purpose.
The money so obtained was paid into the treasury of the maker.
Defendants completed the work as directors of the maker by
means of said money thus obtained. Whatever interest the
defendants had in the completion of contracts by the company
seems to have been as stockholders of the maker. It does
not appear that Luckenbach knew that the directors of the
company had not authorized the giving of its note, nor does it
appear that he dealt with the company other than as the maker.
The company having received the benefits of the act of the
directors in giving its note must be considered to have adopted
their act as its own and the note as its own note. These facts
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do not appear inconsistent with the view that the company
borrowed the money for its own use and not for the accommodation of the defendants.
It is not clear from the reported facts that the defendants
had at the time of their endorsing the note no reason to expect
that it would be paid if presented. The facts show neither the
amount of the consideration, nor what proportion, if any, would
be due or payable to the company at the maturity of the note,
but it is not shown that at that time the company would not
have valuable rights under the contract which it could have
assigned if necessary for money to meet the note. No agreement it shown whereby the maker was excused from paying
the note.
In Re Smith, io6 Fed. 65 a partner who endorsed the note of
his firm and afterwards did an act equivalent to waiving presentment, both as maker and endorser, the firm being insolvent
and he unable to meet the note was held to come within section
115 of the Massachusetts Negotiable Instruments Act which
provided that "where the endorser is the person to whom the instrument is presented for payment" notice of the dishonor of the
note need not be given to him.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
The town of Laurinburg entered into a contract for the construction of a sewer system, the contractor giving a bond, with
the defendant company as surety, conditioned for
Companies

the performance of the contract.

The contractor

abandoned the work and the town brings suit
against the surety company on the bond. The defence is, inter
alia, that material changes were made in the location and character of the work, thereby discharging the surety.
Held, the surety was not discharged, for the contract, fairly
construed, authorized reasonable changes. "But if this were
not so, it is undisputed that the changes made were all in
favor of the contractor. Fully recognizing the rule of strictissimi juris as applying to contracts growing out of the ordinary
relation of creditor and simple surety we cannot, and do not,
recognize this rule as applying to contracts" of a bonding company insuring the performance of contracts as a business and
for profit. Atlantic Trust and Deposit Co. v. Town of Laurinburg, 163 Fed. 69o.
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We have here an interesting example of the way in which the
law, by judicial legislation, may grow to meet new economic
conditions. It seems not improbable that the dictum of Judge
Dayton in this case may be an opening wedge that will at last
split off from the general law of suretyship a special law of
surety companies. In sole support of its contention the Court
cites the case of Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co., 191 U. S.
416, 19o3, where the Supreme Court said that the rule of
strictissimi juris "ought not to be extended to contracts not
within the reason of the rule, particularly when the bond is
underwritten by a corporation, which has undertaken for a
profit to insure the obligee against the failure of performance
on the part of the principal obligor." Such words though obiter
dicta show a strong feeling that the law as it exists to-day is
too lenient toward the surety where such is a guaranty company. There is doubtless ground for such feeling, and it seems
likely that the distinction here contended for will eventually
be embodied in our law.

PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS.
By an agreement made November 12, 1897, in pursuance of
an ordinance of councils approved on the same date, the City.
of Philadelphia leased to the United Gas Improvement Company for the term beginning Nov. 12,
1897 and ending Dec. 31, 1927 the Philadelphia
Against
Consumers
Gas Works. The Gas Company is by law obliged
to furnish gas to all persons residing in the city of Philadelphia
occupying premises therein who apply therefor and comply
with the Gas Company's rules and regulations. It furnishes
gas on credit to large numbers of persons of small means,
against whom it is impossible to collect the amounts due by
process of law.
Prior to the lease to the defendant gas company the gas
works had been under the control of trustees for the city who
adopted, as authorized by Ordinance of February 8, 1838, the
following regulations: (i) that in default of payment for gas
consumed within ten days after bill is rendered the flow of gas
may be stopped until the bill is paid; (2) that a penalty of
three per cent. will be added on all bills for gas not paid at
their office within five days after presentation.
Clause ii of defendants' lease authorizes it, its successors
and assigns, to enforce the same penalties for non-payment of
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bills at their offices within five days after presentation as are
now in force in the city of Philadelphia, and to enforce the
same remedies against consumers for breaches of their contracts for the supply of gas. The defendant has enforced
aforesaid penalties, but is found by the Court never to have
stopped the flow of gas for non-payment of a penalty (p. 118).
Complainants filed applications with the defendant whereby
each complainant agreed to pay for the gas consumed promptly
and according to the rules of the defendant. Defendant furnished gas to complainants. They neglected to pay within five
days after the presentation of the bill by the defendant for
gas consumed by them, and were obliged to pay the three per
cent. penalty. They filed this bill in equity praying, inter alia,
for an injunction restraining the defendant from adding the
three per cent. or any other penalty to bills not paid at the
contract time, from shutting off the gas in case of a refusal to
pay such additional sums and for a return of those previously
collected.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in an opinion by Head, J.,
affirmed a decree dismissing the bill and held that the city of
Philadelphia in undertaking to furnish citizens with gas prior
to the lease to defendant was acting as a private coporation;
that in such capacity it could lawfully enter into contracts with
consumers in which it expressly reserves the right to stop
the supply in case of a breach of the contract by the consumers' neglect or refusal to pay the stipulated rates at the
time and place agreed upon; that the lease contains nothing
prohibiting the lessee from enforcing its corporate right to
adopt and enforce the regulations to secure payment of bills,
already quoted. and which had so long been in force and they
were accordingly adopted; that the regulation now attacked
has not been declared to be unreasonable nor has it been regarded by the courts as a penalty for the non-payment of a
sum of money at a stipulated time, but is a payment by the consumer, who is in default, because he does not wish the defendant to exercise its conceded right to shut off the gas and thus
terminate the relation between them. Bowers v. United Gas Inprovement CompanY, 37 Pa. Superior Court i13 (19o8).
In supplying gas or water to its citizens the city acts as a
private corporation and has the right to make and enforce reasonable regulations to insure prompt payment. Commonwealth
v. Phila., 132 Pa. 288 (x89o) ; Brumm's Appeal, 22 W. N. C.
137 (Pa. Sup. Ct., 1888).
In the following case the Court refused to restrain the city
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of Philadelphia from cutting off the plaintiff's water supply because they refused to pay three years' arrearages of water rent
which had accumulated previously during the ownership of other
parties, together with a penalty of fifteen per centum for nonpayment according to Ordinance of July 12, 1862 (Girard Ins.
Co. v. Phila., 88 Pa. 393, 1879) ; followed in case of practically
similar regulation as to payment for gas (Coin. v. Phila.,
supra). But compare Turner v. Revere Water Co., 171 Mass.
329 (1898), where a water company was enjoined from cutting off water for non-payment of water rent arrearages which
accrued during previous occupaucy of other parties, such regulation being held unreasonable and void.
Defendant printed a copy of said rules and regulations upon
the back of every bill rendered by the defendant to consumers
of gas. This is a sufficient notice of said regulations. Miller
V. Wilkesbarre Gas Co., 2o6 Pa. 254 (1903).

TAXATION.
For a considerable time the appellee had made to the tax assessors falsereturns of his personal property. These theyaccepted
FalseTa

as true and collected taxes upon them yearly.

On discovering the fraud, the assessors made a reassessment of Schmuck's personal property for
each of the past twenty-three years, and tried to collect from
him taxes on an aggregate re-assessment of twelve million dollars. The Supreme Court denied the recovery. Schmuck v.
Hartman, 222 Pa. 19o. The obligation to pay taxes is purely
statutory, and the means of obtaining them from taxables must
therefore be purely statutory. When a taxable makes a false
return, the Commonwealth or County has but one remedy provided by statute,--a new valuation by the Board of Revision of
Taxes [Sections io, ii, Act of 1889, P. L. 4251. But since taxes
are assessed and paid yearly, the remedy upon one valuation
must be lost by using it as a basis for payment. In Williamson's
Estate, 153 Pa. 508, the circumstances were somewhat similar.
There the testator refused to give any returns, and for years
was taxed upon the assessor's mistakenly low valuation of his
personal property plus the statutory penalty of fifty per cent.
[Act of 1885, P. L. 196, sec. 9]. When the city found that the
assessments for the past year had been far too low, it was held
that they had discovered their mistake too late. No remedy
was provided by statute against a taxable who refused to
Rturm
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make return, except the remedy which had been adopted.
From these two cases it seems that a false return, or failure to
make any return, may operate in the taxable's favor, if he can
carry them over until taxes have been paid either on his false
return or on the mistaken return of the assessors. The Court,
in the later case, intimates that the legislature should devise a
means of ending this species of fraud.

TORTS.
Plaintiff's intestate had been killed in a railway accident in
Alabama. The defendant railway company was sued in the
Georgia courts, under an Alabama statute, which
courts o
enabled the personal representative of a person
Different
through the negligence, etc., of a person or
killed
stal
corporation to recover punitive damages for such
wrongful act. Finding to its satisfaction that the statute in
question was neither penal in character, nor subversive of public
policy, the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized it, and
awarded damages to the plaintiff. (Southern Ry. Co. v. Decker,
62 S. E. Rep. 679.)
With the Court's statement of the principles of law on the
subject, no quarrel can be made. It is supported by text-books
and a long line of decisions. Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 9,
10, 194; Huntingdon v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657. But with the
application of these principles to the facts in hand the same
satisfaction cannot be expressed. The statute under which the
cause of action arose reads in part as follows:
"A personal representative may maintain an action, and recover such damages as the jury may assess, for the wrongful
act, omission or negligence of any person or persons, or corporation. his or their agent or servants, whereby the death of
his testator or intestate was caused, if the testator or intestate
could have maintained an action for such wrongful act, etc.,
if it had not caused death. Such action shall not abate by the
death of the defendant, but may be revived against his personal representative; and may be maintained, though there has
not been prosecution or conviction or acquittal of the defendant for such wrongful act, etc., and the damages recovered are
not subject to the payment of debts or liabilities of the testator
or intestate, but must be distributed according to the statute of
distributions."
It is difficult to see on the face of the matter why this statute
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is not of such, penal character as to prevent its judicial recognition. The intention of the Alabama legislature in passing the
act, which ought to be conclusive in the matter of interpretation,
was, as the Court itself says, to prevent homicide,-not to aid
the needy.
A statute giving a right of recovery is often penal as to one
party, and remedial as to the other; and the true test would
seem in such case to be whether the main purpose of the
statute is the giving of compensation for injury sustained, or the
infliction of punishment on the wrongdoer. In the case in hand
it is to be noted that the foundation for the act is "loss of life
by reason of the defendant's negligence." The statute gives a
right of action to the personal representative of the deceased
for the benefit of his widow, children, or heirs; and if a right
of recovery is established, the damages are to be assessed with
reference to the degree of the defendant's culpability. It appears then, that whatever the damages may be, or whomsoever
the person for whose benefit they are recovered, they are not
given with reference to the damage sustained.
And the wealth or habits of the deceased may have been such
as to preclude the existence of any pecuniary interest in the
continuance of his life. All these matters which enter into the
question of compensation are excluded from the inquiry. The
wrongdoer is punished whether the person recovering has sustained a substantial injury or not. If the beneficiary has in fact
sustained a substantial injury, it is in no way made the basis
of the recovery. There is no ascertainment of the loss suffered;
the amount of the verdict is to be determined by the culpability
of the defendant's act, regardless of the injury resulting from it
to the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought. It is
difficult to say that an assessment which is made to depend
solely on the degree of the party's culpability is not meted out
primarily as a punishment. The sum is to be determined by the
very considerations that would govern a court in fixing a fine
for involuntary manslaughter. The fact that it is given to
persons whom the law would have entitled to share in the estate
of the deceased cannot control the construction. A statute
may be penal, though the entire amount recovered is given
directly to the party injured.
The Court seems to have had some difficulty in sustaining its
interpretation with authorities. Every state has of course the
privilege of its own versions of the statutes of sister states
(Huntingdonv. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657; Evey v. Mexican Central
R. Co., 81 Fed. 294); but it appears peculiar that the Court
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here should pass lightly over the twenty-odd decisions in Alabama holding that this is a penal statute, and fall somewhat
lamely back on an interpretation of it by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. And it is to be remembered, also, that acts with
provisions practically identical with those in the case at hand,
have been held to be penal. Adams v. R. R., 67 Vt. 76
(1894) ; O'Reilly v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., I6 R. I. 388 (1889) ;
Richardson v. N. Y. C. R. R., 98 Mass. 85 (1867); Marshall
v. Wabash R. R., 46 Fed. 269 (i89i).
It is to be admitted on the other hand, however, that there
has been among the Courts in recent years a growing tendency
toward liberality in such cases; and as the Court remarked,
statutes which at one time were regarded as strictly penal, are
now everywhere enforceable. The case is therefore of great
interest, apart from its exhaustive review of the law on the
subject, as an indicium of the latest and broadest views on
inter-state jurisdiction.
Action against a charitable hospital corporation for damages for injuries to plaintiff by being run into in the street by
an ambulance of defendant, through the negligence
of the driver. Held, there is no ground for the
Liability of
Charitable
exemption of charitable corporations from liability
for tihe Torts
Corporation
of its Servnts for the torts of their servants to outsiders. Kellogg

v. Church Charity Foundation, 112 N. Y. Supp.
566.
In this case the Court in a very learned opinion has minutely
examined the rule absolving charitable corporations from liability for the torts of their servants, and has come to the conclusion that it is not applicable.
After pointing out the fact that the case is one to which,
ordinarily, the rule respondeat superiorwould apply, the Court
goes on to show that all the reasons usually given for not applying that rule to a charitable corporation are either unsound
or inapplicable to the present facts. The reasons usually given
are that respondeat superior does not apply to a charitable corporation: (a) Because it derives no profit or benefit from the
business in which it is engaged, Mulchey v. Society, 125 Mass.
487. This is not a sound reason, inasmuch as many institutions
that receive no profit or benefit are nevertheless liable. (b) Because payment of damages would be a diversion of the trust
funds, which would be enjoined by equity, and such a judgment
would therefore be nugatory. Powersv. Hospital, io 9 Fed. 294.
This cannot be sound as it does not apply in cases where the
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tort has been the violation of some absolute, non-delegable duty,
in which case even a charity is held liable. Also, damages for
the non-negligent tort of an express trustee, although recoverable against him only individually, will be paid out of the trust
fund if there was no wilful misconduct. Shepard v. Creamer,
16o Mass. 496. (c) Because the beneficiaries of a charitable
corporation, by receiving its services, impliedly waive any right
of action for injuries due to negligence of the employees.
Hearns v. Hospital, 66 Conn. 123. This rule is sound but
would not apply to a case like the principal one where the
plaintiff is an outsider. The Court therefore applies the rule,
respondeatsuperior and holds defendant liable. Accord: Bruce
v. Cent. M. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230.

TRADE MARKS.
A sold drinks in bottles, in which was blown his name. B
obtained some of the bottles (which also had on them the
legend, "This bottle never sold"), and sold another
Covenants
Runni z ,ta drink in them. A brought a bill to restrain, and
Pe-rsoa
obtained an injunction. Correro v. Wright, 47
rorty
Southern 379.
For a further discussion, see Note, p. 251 of this issue.
The complainant in 1891 commenced to manufacture a
roofing material of felt saturated with a gum composed of
the residuum of animal fats. The gum closely
"Ruberold"
a Descriptive resembled rubber, and the roofing material was
Name
designated by the complainant as "Ruberoid." In
19Ol the complainant registered this name as a trade mark, and
now seeks to restrain the alleged infringement thereof by the
defndant's use of name "Rubber 0" as applied to a similar
roofing material.
Held, that "Ruberoid" as applied to the complainant's roofing material is not a valid trade mark as it is merely a misspelling of rubberoid, which is a common descriptive term
signifying a resemblance to rubber, and the use of which belongs to the public. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co. v. Standard
Paint Co., 163 Fed. 977 (1908).
This is an instructive case on an increasingly important
branch of the law, and clearly illustrates two fundamental
principles as to the validity of trade marks: (i) that "there
can be no technical trade mark right in words used to denote
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class, grade, style, quality, ingredients or characteristics" of the
article in question; and (2) that a descriptive word invalid as
a trade mark cannot be made a valid trade mark merely by
misspelling it.
In accordance with the first of these principles which is supported by a long line of decisions holding that such words as
"Medicated Mexican Balm" applied to hair grease [Perry v.
Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66 (i842)] and "Iron Bitters" applied to
medicine [Brown Chemical Co. v. Myers, 139 U. S. 540 (189o) ]
are not valid trade marks, the Court decided that the word
"rubberoid" signified a resemblance to rubber and could not
therefore, be adopted as a trade mark. The difficulty in trade
mark cases is usually not as to the law but as to the facts, and
in this connection it is interesting to note that the English Court
of Appeals recently has protected the word "Tabloid" as a
trade mark on the ground that at the time of its adoption by
complainant it was not a word descriptive of the article to which
it was applied. Welcome v. Thompson and Capper L. R.
(1904) i Ch. Div. 736. The similarity of this case with the
case in question is striking and yet different conclusions were
reached.
Under the second principle it has been held that such words
as "Kid Nee Kure" applied to a medicine [Ex parte Henderson, 85 Off. Gaz. 453], and "Roachsault" applied to roach
poison [Barrett Chemical Co. v. Stern, 176 N. Y. 27], being
merely misspellings of descriptive words are not valid trade
marks, and, in accordance therewith the Court held that in this
case "nothing could be gained by the mere dropping of a 'b'
from the appropriate word expressive of the advertised qualities
of complainant's product"
TRUSTS.
Plaintiff brought an action to recover on a promissory note
made to her by her husband, as evidence of his having received certain money of hers from her father's
estate. The note was not to bear interest until
Note I..
twelve months after his death. Held, the writing
Wusband to
Wife
does not purport to create a trust either directly
or inferentially. On the contrary it purports to create the relation of debtor and creditor, and is barred by the statute of
limitations. Rice v. Crozier, 117 N. W. 984.
Though the agreement to pay interest is almost conclusive
evidence against the existence of a trust (National Bank v.
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McMurray, 98 Pa. 538) yet the converse is of course not true,
and the mere fact that interest was not to be paid, is no evidence of a trust. Furthermore, it is well settled that where the
one to whom money is entrusted has the right to mingle the fund
with his own money and is liable only to pay back an equivalent
sum, he does not become a trustee, but a mere debtor (Shoemaker v. Hinze, 53 Wis. ii6) although it is for the defendant
to show affirmatively that he had this right to mix the money
with his own (Wallace v. Castle, 14 Hun. io6). Nothing in
the case indicates that the money was set apart by the defendant
as in Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, nor does it appear that
it was "applied" for any purpose, as required in Massey's Case,
39 L. J. Ch. 635. The Court was therefore clearly justified in
its decision, from whatever standpoint the case may be
viewed.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska recently decided a very interesting case involving the limitations of the right to discharge one's surface-waters on the land of another.
Draiae ot
surace
The facts, which were somewhat unusual were
Watrs
briefly as follows: X and Y were adjoining landowners. A portion of X's land was occupied by a large depression covering some fifty acres, which drained the surface
water from the surrounding four hundred acres. During part
of the year this depression was entirely inundated, and was at
all times unfit for cultivation. Only a few yards away from
this lagoon there was a natural draw or canyon beginning in
Y's land, running through X's land to the river, and forming
the natural outlet for surface waters in the vicinity. Y connected a pond and draw by an artificial ditch, thereby draining
his land, but rendering the bed of the draw in X's laud unfit
for cultivation. X in the suit charged no negligence, but contended that it was an actionable wrong to collect in the artificial
drain the waters draining naturally into the basin on Y's
prexmises and discharge them through the draw on X's land.
The Court held that Y was within his rights, and dismissed the
suit. Arthur v. Glover, ii8 N. W. iii.
At first blush this decision seems contrary to the well-established rule that a land owner has no right to collect surface
water in an artificial channel and discharge it upon an adjoining proprietor (Gould, Water, P. 271); and contrary also to
the earlier Nebraska case of Davis v. Londgren, 8 Neb. 43,
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which enjoined the draining of just such a pond. Each of these
difficulties is on the surface, however. In Davis v. Londgren
the Court, while using rather broad language, decided merely
that surface water on the upper estate could not be collected in
an artificial channel, and thrown on the land below, there to
remain, or to cut a channel for itself to some lower level; the
right to use a natural surface waterway, and increase its flowage by the drainage through artificial channels of ponds or
lagoons of a temporary character, did not enter into the consideration of the case. In the present case Y did not, strictly
speaking, accumulate surface water and cast it on the lands of
his neighbor; what he did was to drain the basin by ax artificial
channel into a draw or natural waterway passing over his land,
where the water flowed according to the natural course of
drainage over the lands of the lower proprietor, thereby increasing the flow of surface drainage on 4oo acres of land.
Now the rule at common law is well settled that a landowner may discharge surface water by means of artificial channels into a river, thereby accelerating its flow, (McCormick v.
Horan, 8i N. Y. 86; Gould on Water, page 275), even though
it adds to the burden of his neighbor below. The run in the
present case, while not a water-course in the technical sense of
the term, was unmistakably a natural waterway or channel, in
which surface water collected and flowed to its mouth, and
affording an outlet for all the water naturally draining therein
from the surrounding country into the river a short distance
away. It was one degree removed from natural water courses
in their technical signification. If the basin on Y's land had
been filled up, the natural drainage would be toward and into
the draw, and thus through X's land. It would seem then,
under the facts and circumstances as narrated, to be no infringement of X's rights, that Y by adhering to the natural
course of drainage, had increased the surface water draining
into the draw to the extent necessary to drain 4oo acres, which
otherwise would flow into the basin on Y's land, and there
remain.
The Court founds its decision principally upon Todd v.
Co., 72 Neb. 207, and Aldritt v. Fleischauer, 74 Neb. 66,
two cases which have been cited with approval in Farnham on
Waters (Vol. III, page 887), while the other decisions cited,
though not entirely in point, bear out the general doctrine. The
case is one of vital interest in the Prairie States, in which these
natural draws form almost the entire means of drainage, so
that any decision inhibiting such use of them would be undoubtedly prejudicial to the general interests.

